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A new worm discovered July 13th, 2001 focused directly on
www.whitehouse.gov. The worm is no longer limiting itself to
www.whitehouse.gov. This particular worm does have some destructive
payload, meaning it can destroy or delete files, but the major problem
it is causing is a degradation of performance and system instability.
The Code Red worm has attacked thousands of sites. A Microsoft patch was available
for almost a month, but most organizations, including wwww.whitehouse.gov,
did not install it. Patches alone are not a viable solution.
The target of the attack:
- Web Servers: IIS 4.0 5.0 Web Servers, using
English with Index Server Installed
- Operating System: NT, Windows2000 (the default configuration)
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The worm uses an HTTP get attack buffer overflow with special characters to
exploit the Index Service DLL exploit, published June 18th 2001.
The specific DLL exploited is idq.dll which allows for ISAPI
extensions to access administrative scripts (.ida file types) and Internet
Data Queries (.idq file types). The buffer overflow is targeted
at default.ida, which allows the exploiting process to access
System space and gain control of the system.
The worm spreads from each site to 100 random sites. It also defaces the
attacked site. Ultimately, the final target of the Code Red worm is to
launch a DoS (Denial of Service) attack against the White House web server.
To date, it has caused damage to thousands of sites, estimated to be more
than 300,000 servers.
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The vulnerability is in systems that are running unpatched IIS web-servers.
The vulnerability is a buffer overflow in one of the executable files
(a ".ida" file). The vulnerability is achieved by doing a
"buffer overflow" on the parameter name, thereby causing the
server to run malicious code (the worm is just one example of such code).
- The vulnerability in IIS Index Server was found on June 12, 2001
- Microsoft issued a patch on June 12, 2001
- The attack of the Code Red worm began on July 19, 2001
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When a vulnerability is foundthe clock starts ticking.
- A patch is created and tested by the vendor.
- The patch is downloaded by the organization.
- The patch is tested internally by the organization.
- The patch is installed into the production environmentthe clock stops ticking.
The typical patch latency period is a few weeks to many months. During this period the site
is completely vulnerable.
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The worm is limited to three disruptive functions, but could
easily be re-designed to do much more damage.
- Page defacement
- System degradation
- Denial of Service attack (DoS)
Patches are not enough!
Solutions that are based on applying patches will always lag behind
the new vulnerabilities and attacks.
The only way to address security is by solving the generic problem and
not being dependent on the specific attack.
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AppShield is an automatic Web application firewall which
recognizes the correct behavior of the Web site.
The Code Red worm does not behave according to the correct behavior
of the Web site in the following ways:
- Illegal entry point into the site to the .ida file
- Illegal parameter tampering of the .ida file
- Buffer Overflow attempt on the parameter
- Illegal characters within the parameter
The exploit requires that a buffer overflow with special characters be
passed to the file default.ida via HTTP/HTML.
AppShield would protect against this exploit by preventing the following:
- Illegal characters (The malicious code contains non-printable characters)
- Application Buffer Overflows
- Parameter Tampering (ida file as input parameter) The "long" parameter
name did not appear in a previous form and is therefore illegal.
- Forceful Browsing (illegal access to default.ida) A link to
the ".ida" file does not exist in the site so AppShield
prevents the "forceful browsing".
AppShield stops the Code Red worm without any updates.
More importantly:
- Appshield stops any known or unknown worm attack.
- AppShield stops any known or unknown human attack.
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AppShield protects against the Code Red worm by preventing the site infection
in a generic way. It does not require a patch.
AppShield protects against all current and future Web application attacks without
the need for updates.
AppShield is the ONLY solution to address vulnerabilities in a generic manner.
Call Sanctum at 1-888-280-8503 to help your company stop Code Red from
shutting down your site.
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